Svetovi sa čudima ili svetovi bez čuda

Abstract

Ovaj članak se bavi Luisovim i Mekolovim modelima semantike za protivčinjeničke iskaze koji uključuju pozivanje na moguće svetove. Najveće teškoće koje autor nalazi u tim modelima jesu da one počivaju na spornoj realističkoj pretpostavci o samosvojnom postojanju mogućih svetova i na nedovoljno jasnoj ideji o komparativnoj sličnosti tih svetova. Prema mišljenju autora, ove teškoće su toliko velike da bi, u odnosu na predložene modele, prednost valjalo dati klasičnoj, probabilističkoj analizi protivčinjeničkih iskaza.

This paper deals with Lewis' and McCall's possible worlds semantics for counterfactuals. Both views are infected with the vagueness which is inherent to the idea of comparative similarity of possible worlds. To resolve the difficulties Lewis and McCall invoke the notion of miracle. It is argued that this notion couldn't be accommodated within a deterministic framework. In the concluding part of the paper, it is suggested that maybe the more promising way for Lewis' semantics is to rely on the idea of relevant differences between possible worlds, rather than on the idea of their comparative similarity. However, the author opt for the older, the so-called inferential approach to the counterfactuals.