Functionally Extended Cognition
Апстракт
The hypothesis of the Extended Cognition (ExCog), formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998), aims to be a bold and new hypothesis about realisers of cognitive processes. It claims that sometimes cognitive processes extend above the limits of the skin and skull and include chunks of the environment as their partial realisers. One of the most pursuassive arguments in support of this assertion is the famous "parity argument" which calls upon functional similarities between extended cognitive processes and relevant internal processes. This very kind of reasoning gave rise to several arguments against ExCog by way of comparing it to functionalism about the mental, which conclude that ExCog must be trivial, radical or unjustified. In this paper ExCog and the underlying parity principle will be defended against four different kinds of "functionalist" arguments. It will be argued that ExCog can be justified as a special form of functionalism, that it is not trivial nor entailed by the known vers...ions of functionalism, and that the accusation of it being too radical is unwarranted.
Кључне речи:
parity principle / Martian intuition / functionalism / Extended cognitionИзвор:
Prolegomena, 2013, 12, 2, 315-336Издавач:
- Soc Advancement Philosophy-Zagreb, Zagreb
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Milojević, Miljana PY - 2013 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/1603 AB - The hypothesis of the Extended Cognition (ExCog), formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998), aims to be a bold and new hypothesis about realisers of cognitive processes. It claims that sometimes cognitive processes extend above the limits of the skin and skull and include chunks of the environment as their partial realisers. One of the most pursuassive arguments in support of this assertion is the famous "parity argument" which calls upon functional similarities between extended cognitive processes and relevant internal processes. This very kind of reasoning gave rise to several arguments against ExCog by way of comparing it to functionalism about the mental, which conclude that ExCog must be trivial, radical or unjustified. In this paper ExCog and the underlying parity principle will be defended against four different kinds of "functionalist" arguments. It will be argued that ExCog can be justified as a special form of functionalism, that it is not trivial nor entailed by the known versions of functionalism, and that the accusation of it being too radical is unwarranted. PB - Soc Advancement Philosophy-Zagreb, Zagreb T2 - Prolegomena T1 - Functionally Extended Cognition EP - 336 IS - 2 SP - 315 VL - 12 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1603 ER -
@article{ author = "Milojević, Miljana", year = "2013", abstract = "The hypothesis of the Extended Cognition (ExCog), formulated by Clark and Chalmers (1998), aims to be a bold and new hypothesis about realisers of cognitive processes. It claims that sometimes cognitive processes extend above the limits of the skin and skull and include chunks of the environment as their partial realisers. One of the most pursuassive arguments in support of this assertion is the famous "parity argument" which calls upon functional similarities between extended cognitive processes and relevant internal processes. This very kind of reasoning gave rise to several arguments against ExCog by way of comparing it to functionalism about the mental, which conclude that ExCog must be trivial, radical or unjustified. In this paper ExCog and the underlying parity principle will be defended against four different kinds of "functionalist" arguments. It will be argued that ExCog can be justified as a special form of functionalism, that it is not trivial nor entailed by the known versions of functionalism, and that the accusation of it being too radical is unwarranted.", publisher = "Soc Advancement Philosophy-Zagreb, Zagreb", journal = "Prolegomena", title = "Functionally Extended Cognition", pages = "336-315", number = "2", volume = "12", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1603" }
Milojević, M.. (2013). Functionally Extended Cognition. in Prolegomena Soc Advancement Philosophy-Zagreb, Zagreb., 12(2), 315-336. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1603
Milojević M. Functionally Extended Cognition. in Prolegomena. 2013;12(2):315-336. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1603 .
Milojević, Miljana, "Functionally Extended Cognition" in Prolegomena, 12, no. 2 (2013):315-336, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_1603 .