Izazovi Kvajnovom naturalizmu

Abstract

U radu nastojimo da rekonstruišemo Kvajnov projekat naturalističke epistemologije i otkrijemo u kakvom je odnosu sa njegovim ostalim filozofskim stavovima, budući da je naturalizam, za Kvajna, izlaz iz većine neprilika u koje je zapao. Upravo je naturalizam taj koji treba da pomiri suprotstavljena tvrđenja koja je tokom vremena zastupao. Ipak, time što bismo ga izdvojili kao primaran doveli bismo u pitanje važnost nekih drugih aspekata njegove filozofije, pre svega empirizma. O tome da taj izbor svakako nije lak, najbolje govori činjenica da ga ni sam Kvajn nije načinio. Videćemo da je on ponudio kako argumente u prilog tome da je naturalizam važniji, tako i argumente koji favorizuju empirizam.

Our aim in this paper is to reconstruct Quine's project of naturalistic epistemology and to investigate its relationship with the rest of his philosophy. For Quine naturalism offered a way out of most of the problems he was facing and was meant to reconcile conflicting standpoints he held over the years. However, by assigning some sort of primacy to naturalism one can shed doubt on the importance of some other aspects of his philosophy, most notably his empiricism. That this move is not an easy one to make is witnessed by the fact that Quine himself refrained from making it. We will show that he offered arguments which favor one, as well as arguments favoring the other.