Retorika i razboritost (phronesisi) u Aristotelovoj praktičkoj filozofiji (ogled)

Abstract

Both rhetoric and phronesis are intellectual virtues which guide us in persuasion or action, and not only the general resourcefulness in the accomplishment of the desirable goals. The knowledge of the means of persuasion, as well as the knowledge of the way of achieving a moral goal, can be measured not only by the criteria of correctness or incorrectness, and effectiveness or ineffectiveness, but also by criteria of just and unjust. Truly to become a man of practical wisdom (phronimos) or a persuasive orator presupposes a certain attitude or habit (hexis), i.e. the way of life, which is a fertile ground for the development of natural brightness or eloquence. The analysis of the relations between rhetoric and phronesis shows that not only the subject- matter which both of them are concerned with is identical, but also that they themselves - as well as their interrelation - can be understood by the same notions. On one hand, ideal rhetor should be a man of practical wisdom, and on the other, the man of practical wisdom should be particularly motivated for rhetoric, because it is a discursive conveyance and social dissemination of what should be done which he himself had realized in the long process of deliberation.