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Weakness of will and motivational internalism

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Authors
Milevski, Voin
Article (Published version)
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Abstract
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgmen...ts about what is the best option available to them.

Keywords:
weakness of will / psychopathy / practical irrationality / motivational internalism / moral motivation / Depression
Source:
Philosophical Psychology, 2017, 30, 1-2, 44-57
Publisher:
  • Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon
Funding / projects:
  • Dynamic Systems in Nature and Society: Philosophical and Empirical Aspects (RS-179041)

DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317

ISSN: 0951-5089

WoS: 000401152100003

Scopus: 2-s2.0-84994896273
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1
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2466
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Milevski, Voin
PY  - 2017
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2466
AB  - The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them.
PB  - Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon
T2  - Philosophical Psychology
T1  - Weakness of will and motivational internalism
EP  - 57
IS  - 1-2
SP  - 44
VL  - 30
DO  - 10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Milevski, Voin",
year = "2017",
abstract = "The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them.",
publisher = "Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
title = "Weakness of will and motivational internalism",
pages = "57-44",
number = "1-2",
volume = "30",
doi = "10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317"
}
Milevski, V.. (2017). Weakness of will and motivational internalism. in Philosophical Psychology
Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon., 30(1-2), 44-57.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317
Milevski V. Weakness of will and motivational internalism. in Philosophical Psychology. 2017;30(1-2):44-57.
doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317 .
Milevski, Voin, "Weakness of will and motivational internalism" in Philosophical Psychology, 30, no. 1-2 (2017):44-57,
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317 . .

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