Weakness of will and motivational internalism
Само за регистроване кориснике
2017
Чланак у часопису (Објављена верзија)
Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgmen...ts about what is the best option available to them.
Кључне речи:
weakness of will / psychopathy / practical irrationality / motivational internalism / moral motivation / DepressionИзвор:
Philosophical Psychology, 2017, 30, 1-2, 44-57Издавач:
- Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon
Финансирање / пројекти:
- Динамички системи у природи и друштву: Филозофски и емпиријски аспекти (RS-MESTD-Basic Research (BR or ON)-179041)
DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317
ISSN: 0951-5089
WoS: 000401152100003
Scopus: 2-s2.0-84994896273
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Milevski, Voin PY - 2017 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2466 AB - The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. PB - Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon T2 - Philosophical Psychology T1 - Weakness of will and motivational internalism EP - 57 IS - 1-2 SP - 44 VL - 30 DO - 10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317 ER -
@article{ author = "Milevski, Voin", year = "2017", abstract = "The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to phi in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to phi in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent's moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them.", publisher = "Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon", journal = "Philosophical Psychology", title = "Weakness of will and motivational internalism", pages = "57-44", number = "1-2", volume = "30", doi = "10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317" }
Milevski, V.. (2017). Weakness of will and motivational internalism. in Philosophical Psychology Routledge Journals, Taylor & Francis Ltd, Abingdon., 30(1-2), 44-57. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317
Milevski V. Weakness of will and motivational internalism. in Philosophical Psychology. 2017;30(1-2):44-57. doi:10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317 .
Milevski, Voin, "Weakness of will and motivational internalism" in Philosophical Psychology, 30, no. 1-2 (2017):44-57, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1255317 . .