Приказ основних података о документу

dc.creatorPrelević, Duško
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T12:47:00Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T12:47:00Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn1333-4395
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2605
dc.description.abstractGasking's parody of Anselm's ontological argument is primarily based on the idea that the greater disability of the creator makes the achievement more impressive, and that, therefore, the non-existent God would be a greater creator of the universe than the existent God would be. On the contrary, I argue that either the non-existent God cannot create anything existent, or, if we introduce Meinongian metaphysics in order to save the parody, that non-existence would cease to be the most formidable handicap within the domain of fictional characters, or that encoded achievements need not be more impressive than exemplified achievements. These insights suggest that Gasking's parody does not work.en
dc.publisherSoc Advancement Philosophy-Zagreb, Zagreb
dc.relationinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MESTD/Basic Research (BR or ON)/179067/RS//
dc.rightsrestrictedAccess
dc.sourceProlegomena
dc.subjectthe ontological argumenten
dc.subjectMeinongianismen
dc.subjectGasking's parodyen
dc.subjectachievementen
dc.subjectAbilityen
dc.titleGasking's Parody Re-examineden
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseARR
dc.citation.epage135
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.other17(2): 127-135
dc.citation.spage127
dc.citation.volume17
dc.identifier.doi10.26362/20180301
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85073735149
dc.identifier.wos000463357000001
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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Приказ основних података о документу