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dc.creatorČukljević, Filip
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-12T12:49:37Z
dc.date.available2021-10-12T12:49:37Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2648
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I will deal with the solution to the problem of cognitive significance offered by the so-called new theorists of reference, as well as with the critique of that solution given by Howard Wettstein. I will claim that the answer to this critique provided by John Perry is not sufficiently convincing. First, I will clarify some relevant concepts in order to present the problem of cognitive significance in a clear manner. Then I will expose the solution to the problem offered by Perry and David Kaplan. After that, I will present Wettstein's critique of that solution. Subsequently, I will also analyze Perry's attempt to defend against this critique. Finally, I will discuss the extent to which Perry's attempt is successful. It will be shown that it is significantly not so.en
dc.publisherUniverzitet u Beogradu - Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd
dc.rightsopenAccess
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvo
dc.subjectthoughten
dc.subjectsenseen
dc.subjectsemanticsen
dc.subjectreferenten
dc.subjectpropositionen
dc.subjectpragmaticsen
dc.subjectcognitive significanceen
dc.subjectcharacteren
dc.titleThe problem of cognitive significance - a solution and a critiqueen
dc.typearticle
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-ND
dc.citation.epage252
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.other29(2): 241-252
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage241
dc.citation.volume29
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1802241C
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/1340/2645.pdf
dc.identifier.scopus2-s2.0-85059201869
dc.identifier.wos000437028100007
dc.type.versionpublishedVersion


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