REFF - Faculty of Philosophy Repository
University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy
    • English
    • Српски
    • Српски (Serbia)
  • English 
    • English
    • Serbian (Cyrillic)
    • Serbian (Latin)
  • Login
View Item 
  •   REFF
  • Filozofija / Philosophy
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
  • View Item
  •   REFF
  • Filozofija / Philosophy
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga

Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism

Thumbnail
2019
2787.pdf (227.3Kb)
Authors
Dobrijević, Aleksandar
Article (Published version)
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
"Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta.
"Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
Keywords:
trebanje / razlozi / normativnost / fundamentalizam trebanja / fundamentalizam razloga / reasons / reasons fundamentalism / ought / ought fundamentalism / normativity
Source:
Theoria, 2019, 62, 2, 153-160
Publisher:
  • Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Funding / projects:
  • Studying climate change and its influence on environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation (RS-43007)
  • Rare Diseases:Molecular Pathophysiology, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Modalities and Social, Ethical and Legal Aspects (RS-41004)

DOI: 10.2298/THEO1902153D

ISSN: 0351-2274

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2790
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Dobrijević, Aleksandar
PY  - 2019
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2790
AB  - "Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta.
AB  - "Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga
T1  - Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism
EP  - 160
IS  - 2
SP  - 153
VL  - 62
DO  - 10.2298/THEO1902153D
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Dobrijević, Aleksandar",
year = "2019",
abstract = ""Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta., "Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga, Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism",
pages = "160-153",
number = "2",
volume = "62",
doi = "10.2298/THEO1902153D"
}
Dobrijević, A.. (2019). Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 62(2), 153-160.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902153D
Dobrijević A. Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga. in Theoria. 2019;62(2):153-160.
doi:10.2298/THEO1902153D .
Dobrijević, Aleksandar, "Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga" in Theoria, 62, no. 2 (2019):153-160,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902153D . .

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
About REFF | Send Feedback

OpenAIRERCUB
 

 

All of DSpaceInstitutions/communitiesAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis institutionAuthorsTitlesSubjects

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
About REFF | Send Feedback

OpenAIRERCUB