Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga
Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism
Abstract
"Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta.
"Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.
Keywords:
trebanje / razlozi / normativnost / fundamentalizam trebanja / fundamentalizam razloga / reasons / reasons fundamentalism / ought / ought fundamentalism / normativitySource:
Theoria, 2019, 62, 2, 153-160Publisher:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Funding / projects:
- Studying climate change and its influence on environment: impacts, adaptation and mitigation (RS-43007)
- Rare Diseases:Molecular Pathophysiology, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Modalities and Social, Ethical and Legal Aspects (RS-41004)
Institution/Community
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Dobrijević, Aleksandar PY - 2019 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2790 AB - "Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta. AB - "Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga T1 - Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism EP - 160 IS - 2 SP - 153 VL - 62 DO - 10.2298/THEO1902153D ER -
@article{ author = "Dobrijević, Aleksandar", year = "2019", abstract = ""Fundamentalisti razloga" tvrde da se normativnost razloga ne može objasniti pomoću drugih normativnih pojmova, a TA je tvrdnja najuže povezana sa dogmom da razlozi predstavljaju jedine fundamentalne elemente normativnog domena. "Fundamentalisti trebanja", pak, tvrde kako je moguće pokazati da je pojam "trebanja" taj koji predstavlja jedini fundament normativnosti. U tekstu se iznosi sumnja u pogledu isključivosti oba ova stanovišta., "Reasons fundamentalists" argue that the normativity of the reasons cannot be explained in terms of other normative concepts, and this claim is most closely related to the dogma that the reasons are the only fundamental elements of the normative domain. "Ought fundamentalists" claim, however, that it is possible to show that the concept of "ought" is the only foundation of normativity. There is doubt as to the exclusivity of both of these views.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga, Skepticism about reasons fundamentalism", pages = "160-153", number = "2", volume = "62", doi = "10.2298/THEO1902153D" }
Dobrijević, A.. (2019). Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 62(2), 153-160. https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902153D
Dobrijević A. Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga. in Theoria. 2019;62(2):153-160. doi:10.2298/THEO1902153D .
Dobrijević, Aleksandar, "Skepticizam u pogledu fundamentalizma razloga" in Theoria, 62, no. 2 (2019):153-160, https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1902153D . .