Ontološke i epistemološke pretpostavke teorija razumevanja drugih

Abstract

U proteklih nekoliko decenija, razvila se intenzivna debata u pogledu toga na koji način razumevamo druga bića i, u vezi s tim, predlagana su različita rešenja. Njihov cilj je da se u potpunosti objasne slučajevi za koje smatramo da smo u stanju da razumemo druge osobe ili pak da se objasni zašto ponekad grešimo kada to pokušavamo da učinimo. U radu se, u cilju boljeg razumevanja čitave debate, ispituju ontološke i epistemološke pretpostavke teorija-teorije i simulacione teorije. Posebna pažnja je posvećena pojmu razumevanja koji je u njima prisutan.

In the last few decades, an intensive debate concerning how we understand others has been conducted and, relating to this, different solutions were proposed. All these solutions aimed at providing a complete explanation of the cases in which we typically hold that we do understand others or at least to explain why sometimes we make mistakes when we try to do that. In this paper, ontological and epistemological assumptions of the theory-theory and the simulation theory are assessed in order to clarify the whole debate. Special attention is paid to the notion of understanding embedded in both theories.