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Može li se odbraniti transcendentalna sloboda?
Can transcendental freedom be defended?
dc.creator | Smajević, Milica | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-12T12:59:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-12T12:59:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0351-2274 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2808 | |
dc.description.abstract | Centralno pitanje koje se postavlja u ovom radu jeste da li je i na koji način moguće odbraniti Kantov pojam transcendentalne slobode. U cilju pružanja odgovora na ovo pitanje ispituje se argument treće antinomije, kao i primena rešenja ove antinomije na sferu ljudskog delanja. Uporednom analizom najzastupljenijih interpretacija Kantove pozicije, dolazi se do zaključka da je ideja transcendentalne slobode plauzibilna, ali samo ukoliko prihvatimo osnovne pojmove na kojima počiva Kantova filozofija, na prvom mestu doktrinu transcendentalnog idealizma, i ukoliko na adekvatan način interpretiramo argumente koje NAM Kant pruža. | SR |
dc.description.abstract | The central question posed in this paper is whether (and how) it is possible to defend Kant's concept of transcendental freedom. In order to provide an answer to this question, the argument of the third antinomy is examined, as well as the application of the solution of this antinomy to the sphere of human action. Comparative analysis of the most common interpretations of Kant's position leads to the conclusion that the idea of transcendental freedom is plausible, but only if we accept the basic concepts on which Kant's philosophy rests, in the first place the doctrine of transcendental idealism, and if we adequately interpret the arguments Kant gives us. | EN |
dc.publisher | Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd | |
dc.rights | openAccess | |
dc.source | Theoria | |
dc.subject | treća antinomija | SR |
dc.subject | transcendentalni idealizam | SR |
dc.subject | ranscendentalna sloboda | SR |
dc.subject | Kant | SR |
dc.subject | empirijski i inteligibilni karakter | SR |
dc.subject | transcendental idealism | EN |
dc.subject | transcendental freedom | EN |
dc.subject | third antinomy | EN |
dc.subject | Kant | EN |
dc.subject | empirical and intelligible character | EN |
dc.title | Može li se odbraniti transcendentalna sloboda? | SR |
dc.title | Can transcendental freedom be defended? | EN |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | ARR | |
dc.citation.epage | 52 | |
dc.citation.issue | 3 | |
dc.citation.other | 62(3): 39-52 | |
dc.citation.rank | M24 | |
dc.citation.spage | 39 | |
dc.citation.volume | 62 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.2298/THEO1903039S | |
dc.identifier.fulltext | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/1489/2805.pdf | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |