Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija
Reasons, rationality, and motivation
Abstract
Prema jednoj od najuticajnijih i najpopularnijih teorija u savremenoj teoriji postupaka, subjekt S je motivisan da uradi određeni postupak P ako i samo ako S prihvata skup razloga R na osnovu kojeg proizlazi da treba da uradi P i ukoliko S ne pati od nekog oblika praktične iracionalnosti (npr. depresije, slabosti volje, psihopatije, mentalne ili fizičke iscrpljenosti i sl.). Bar na prvi pogled, ova teorija - koja je u filozofskoj literaturi poznata kao racionalistički motivacioni internalizam - deluje nekontroverzno i neproblematično. Ipak, u poslednjih desetak godina ova popularna pozicija je suočena sa nizom veoma ozbiljnih prigovora. U toku ovog rada nameravam da izložim neke od tih prigovora, kako bih otvorio prostor za tvrdnju da pojam praktične iracionalnosti - koji igra centralnu ulogu u formulaciji ove varijante internalizma - treba izostaviti iz objašnjenja prirode naše motivacije. Na osnovu ove tvrdnje, pokušaću da odbranim zaključak da racionalistički motivacioni internaliza...m predstavlja sasvim neadekvatnu teoriju motivacije.
According to one of the most influential and popular theories in the contemporary theory of action, an agent S is motivated to perform a certain act A if and only if she endorses some set of reasons R on the basis of which it follows that she should perform A, and given that she does not suffer from some sort of practical irrationality (e.g. depression, weakness of will, psychopathy, mental or physical exhaustion etc.). At least at first glance, this theory - which is known as the rationalist motivational internalism - appears to be uncontroversial and unproblematic. Yet, over the past ten years, this popular position has faced numerous very serious objections. In the course of this work, I intend to present some of these objections, in order to justify the claim that the concept of practical irrationality - i.e. the concept that plays the central role in this particular version of internalism - should be left out from the philosophical explanation of motivation. I will then attempt to... defend the conclusion that the rationalist motivational internalism represents a completely inadequate theory of motivation.
Keywords:
razlozi / praktična iracionalnost. / normativni sud / motivacija / reasons / practical irrationality / normative judgement / motivationSource:
Theoria, 2019, 62, 3, 29-38Publisher:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Funding / projects:
Institution/Community
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Milevski, Voin PY - 2019 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/2811 AB - Prema jednoj od najuticajnijih i najpopularnijih teorija u savremenoj teoriji postupaka, subjekt S je motivisan da uradi određeni postupak P ako i samo ako S prihvata skup razloga R na osnovu kojeg proizlazi da treba da uradi P i ukoliko S ne pati od nekog oblika praktične iracionalnosti (npr. depresije, slabosti volje, psihopatije, mentalne ili fizičke iscrpljenosti i sl.). Bar na prvi pogled, ova teorija - koja je u filozofskoj literaturi poznata kao racionalistički motivacioni internalizam - deluje nekontroverzno i neproblematično. Ipak, u poslednjih desetak godina ova popularna pozicija je suočena sa nizom veoma ozbiljnih prigovora. U toku ovog rada nameravam da izložim neke od tih prigovora, kako bih otvorio prostor za tvrdnju da pojam praktične iracionalnosti - koji igra centralnu ulogu u formulaciji ove varijante internalizma - treba izostaviti iz objašnjenja prirode naše motivacije. Na osnovu ove tvrdnje, pokušaću da odbranim zaključak da racionalistički motivacioni internalizam predstavlja sasvim neadekvatnu teoriju motivacije. AB - According to one of the most influential and popular theories in the contemporary theory of action, an agent S is motivated to perform a certain act A if and only if she endorses some set of reasons R on the basis of which it follows that she should perform A, and given that she does not suffer from some sort of practical irrationality (e.g. depression, weakness of will, psychopathy, mental or physical exhaustion etc.). At least at first glance, this theory - which is known as the rationalist motivational internalism - appears to be uncontroversial and unproblematic. Yet, over the past ten years, this popular position has faced numerous very serious objections. In the course of this work, I intend to present some of these objections, in order to justify the claim that the concept of practical irrationality - i.e. the concept that plays the central role in this particular version of internalism - should be left out from the philosophical explanation of motivation. I will then attempt to defend the conclusion that the rationalist motivational internalism represents a completely inadequate theory of motivation. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija T1 - Reasons, rationality, and motivation EP - 38 IS - 3 SP - 29 VL - 62 DO - 10.2298/THEO1903029M ER -
@article{ author = "Milevski, Voin", year = "2019", abstract = "Prema jednoj od najuticajnijih i najpopularnijih teorija u savremenoj teoriji postupaka, subjekt S je motivisan da uradi određeni postupak P ako i samo ako S prihvata skup razloga R na osnovu kojeg proizlazi da treba da uradi P i ukoliko S ne pati od nekog oblika praktične iracionalnosti (npr. depresije, slabosti volje, psihopatije, mentalne ili fizičke iscrpljenosti i sl.). Bar na prvi pogled, ova teorija - koja je u filozofskoj literaturi poznata kao racionalistički motivacioni internalizam - deluje nekontroverzno i neproblematično. Ipak, u poslednjih desetak godina ova popularna pozicija je suočena sa nizom veoma ozbiljnih prigovora. U toku ovog rada nameravam da izložim neke od tih prigovora, kako bih otvorio prostor za tvrdnju da pojam praktične iracionalnosti - koji igra centralnu ulogu u formulaciji ove varijante internalizma - treba izostaviti iz objašnjenja prirode naše motivacije. Na osnovu ove tvrdnje, pokušaću da odbranim zaključak da racionalistički motivacioni internalizam predstavlja sasvim neadekvatnu teoriju motivacije., According to one of the most influential and popular theories in the contemporary theory of action, an agent S is motivated to perform a certain act A if and only if she endorses some set of reasons R on the basis of which it follows that she should perform A, and given that she does not suffer from some sort of practical irrationality (e.g. depression, weakness of will, psychopathy, mental or physical exhaustion etc.). At least at first glance, this theory - which is known as the rationalist motivational internalism - appears to be uncontroversial and unproblematic. Yet, over the past ten years, this popular position has faced numerous very serious objections. In the course of this work, I intend to present some of these objections, in order to justify the claim that the concept of practical irrationality - i.e. the concept that plays the central role in this particular version of internalism - should be left out from the philosophical explanation of motivation. I will then attempt to defend the conclusion that the rationalist motivational internalism represents a completely inadequate theory of motivation.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija, Reasons, rationality, and motivation", pages = "38-29", number = "3", volume = "62", doi = "10.2298/THEO1903029M" }
Milevski, V.. (2019). Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 62(3), 29-38. https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1903029M
Milevski V. Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija. in Theoria. 2019;62(3):29-38. doi:10.2298/THEO1903029M .
Milevski, Voin, "Razlozi, racionalnost i motivacija" in Theoria, 62, no. 3 (2019):29-38, https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1903029M . .