Samoodbrana i izvinjenje

Abstract

U tekstu se bavim razlikom između dve vrste odbrane u sudskim parnicama-između izvinjenja i opravdanja. Ove dve odbrane se, prema Džonu Ostinu (J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses", 1956-57), međusobno isključuju jer braniti se opravdanjem znači prihvatati odgovornost za postupak i tvrditi da on nije loš, dok odbrana izvinjenjem podrazumeva prihvatanje da se radi o lošem postupku ali se odbacuje odgovornost. Razmatram argumente koje protiv Osti-novog stanovišta iznose Daglas Huzak (Douglas Husak) u "on the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse" (2005), i Endru Boterel (Andrew Botterell) u tekstu "A Primer on the Distinction between Justification and Excuse" (2009). Pokazivaću da su njihovi razlozi u neskladu sa osnovnim standardima o samo-odbrani koja je paradigmatični slučaj opravdanja.

The text deals with the difference between two types of defence in litigation: justifications and excuses. These two defences, according to John Austin ("A Plea for Excuses", 1956-57), are mutually exclusive because justification means accepting responsibility for the act in question and claiming that it is not bad, while excuse involves accepting that the act in question is bad, but denies responsibility. I will present arguments against Austin's viewpoint that are presented by Douglas Husak in "On the Supplied Priority of Justification for Excuse" (2005) and Andrew Botterell in "A Primer on the Distinction between Justific - tion and Excuse" (2009). I will show that their reasons are inconsistent with the basic standards of self-defence, which is a paradigmatic case of justification keywords: excuse, justification, self-defence.