Direktni realizam u teoriji opažanja

Abstract

I have attempted to define the concept of direct perception and to develop the direct realism as a theory based on such concept. My definition gives the concept of direct perception a distinctly non-epistemic character, similarly to Cornman, and at the contrary to Russell and Malcolm. Using mostly the arguments formulated by Daniel Dennet, I have disallowed the possibility of non-epistemic perception of the kind presented by Fred Dretske, With respect to the Dretske's viewpoint, I gave advantage to the Armstrong's cognitivistic approach to the problems of perception. The key role in my defense of the direct realism is played by Chisholm's adverbial theory. The adverbial theory should account for hallucinations and illusions, not using some intermediaries as sense-data are. Although I consider phenomenalism as perfectly compatible with adverbialism, I reject phenomenalism from independent, metaphysical reasons. Finally, I claim that the direct realist should insist on the independence of the object's real properties from the perceiver in order to avoid falling into naive realism. The real properties should be specified in a way that does not demand referring to the perceiver's experiences. It may be done by some Armstrong type empirical identifications. These identifications present the best explanations of the fact that persons with the same physical structure, who are to be found in the same environment, report same experiences. After using this fact for rebutting possible objections to reductionism, and applying the reductionist's strategy to the problems of illusion and hallucinations, I attempt to integrate adverbialism into reductionism. I offer an analysis of perception according to which, when a subject reports that she perceives an object or a quality, she actually reports that she perceives in a way corresponding to the certain proximal stimulation of her sense organs by some light waves, sound waves, etc. I try to retain the power of the adverbial theory against the indirect realism, and to overtake the good responses reductionism offers to the problems of illusions and hallucinations.