REFF - Faculty of Philosophy Repository
University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy
    • English
    • Српски
    • Српски (Serbia)
  • English 
    • English
    • Serbian (Cyrillic)
    • Serbian (Latin)
  • Login
View Item 
  •   REFF
  • Filozofija / Philosophy
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
  • View Item
  •   REFF
  • Filozofija / Philosophy
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
  • View Item
JavaScript is disabled for your browser. Some features of this site may not work without it.

Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici

Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant's ethics

Thumbnail
2020
3009.pdf (363.1Kb)
Authors
Smajević, Milica
Article (Published version)
Metadata
Show full item record
Abstract
U trećem odseku Zasnivanja metafizike morala Kant nastoji da, na osnovu ideje o nužnom pretpostavljanju slobode, pruži dedukciju vrhovnog moralnog principa i da dokaže njegovo objektivno važenje. Tri godine kasnije, u Kritici praktičkog uma, on eksplicitno poriče mogućnost izvođenja navedene dedukcije i promenom metodoloških postavki pokušava da pokaže da svest o moralnom zakonu kao činjenici uma predstavlja osnovu za dedukciju slobode. U ovom radu ćemo zastupati stav da direktan kontrast između dva Kantova teksta jasno pokazuje da je došlo do radikalnog preokreta u njegovoj misli. Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže da je Kant imao razloge da bude nezadovoljan dedukcijom moralnog zakona ponuđenom u Zasnivanju metafizike morala, što ga je navelo da promeni svoj argumentativni tok prilikom pisanja druge Kritike.
In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant's two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.
Keywords:
veliki preokret / sloboda / moralni zakon / Imanuel Kant / dedukcija / moral law / Immanuel Kant / great reversal / freedom / deduction
Source:
Theoria, 2020, 63, 1, 29-42
Publisher:
  • Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd

DOI: 10.2298/THEO2001029S

ISSN: 0351-2274

[ Google Scholar ]
URI
http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3012
Collections
  • Radovi istraživača / Researcher's publications - Odeljenje za filozofiju
Institution/Community
Filozofija / Philosophy
TY  - JOUR
AU  - Smajević, Milica
PY  - 2020
UR  - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3012
AB  - U trećem odseku Zasnivanja metafizike morala Kant nastoji da, na osnovu ideje o nužnom pretpostavljanju slobode, pruži dedukciju vrhovnog moralnog principa i da dokaže njegovo objektivno važenje. Tri godine kasnije, u Kritici praktičkog uma, on eksplicitno poriče mogućnost izvođenja navedene dedukcije i promenom metodoloških postavki pokušava da pokaže da svest o moralnom zakonu kao činjenici uma predstavlja osnovu za dedukciju slobode. U ovom radu ćemo zastupati stav da direktan kontrast između dva Kantova teksta jasno pokazuje da je došlo do radikalnog preokreta u njegovoj misli. Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže da je Kant imao razloge da bude nezadovoljan dedukcijom moralnog zakona ponuđenom u Zasnivanju metafizike morala, što ga je navelo da promeni svoj argumentativni tok prilikom pisanja druge Kritike.
AB  - In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant's two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.
PB  - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
T2  - Theoria
T1  - Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici
T1  - Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant's ethics
EP  - 42
IS  - 1
SP  - 29
VL  - 63
DO  - 10.2298/THEO2001029S
ER  - 
@article{
author = "Smajević, Milica",
year = "2020",
abstract = "U trećem odseku Zasnivanja metafizike morala Kant nastoji da, na osnovu ideje o nužnom pretpostavljanju slobode, pruži dedukciju vrhovnog moralnog principa i da dokaže njegovo objektivno važenje. Tri godine kasnije, u Kritici praktičkog uma, on eksplicitno poriče mogućnost izvođenja navedene dedukcije i promenom metodoloških postavki pokušava da pokaže da svest o moralnom zakonu kao činjenici uma predstavlja osnovu za dedukciju slobode. U ovom radu ćemo zastupati stav da direktan kontrast između dva Kantova teksta jasno pokazuje da je došlo do radikalnog preokreta u njegovoj misli. Cilj ovog teksta je da pokaže da je Kant imao razloge da bude nezadovoljan dedukcijom moralnog zakona ponuđenom u Zasnivanju metafizike morala, što ga je navelo da promeni svoj argumentativni tok prilikom pisanja druge Kritike., In the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seeks, on the basis of the idea of the necessary presumption of freedom, to provide a deduction of the supreme moral principle and to prove its objective validity. Three years later, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he explicitly denies the possibility of making such deduction, and by changing methodological assumptions, tries to show that awareness of the moral law as a fact of reason is the basis for the deduction of freedom. In this paper we will argue that a direct contrast between Kant's two texts clearly shows that a radical shift in his thought has taken place. The purpose of this text is to show that Kant had reasons to be dissatisfied with the deduction of the moral law offered in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, which led him to change his argumentative course when writing the Second Critique.",
publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd",
journal = "Theoria",
title = "Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici, Deduction of morality and freedom in Kant's ethics",
pages = "42-29",
number = "1",
volume = "63",
doi = "10.2298/THEO2001029S"
}
Smajević, M.. (2020). Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici. in Theoria
Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 63(1), 29-42.
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001029S
Smajević M. Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici. in Theoria. 2020;63(1):29-42.
doi:10.2298/THEO2001029S .
Smajević, Milica, "Dedukcija moralnosti i slobode u Kantovoj etici" in Theoria, 63, no. 1 (2020):29-42,
https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2001029S . .

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
About REFF | Send Feedback

OpenAIRERCUB
 

 

All of DSpaceInstitutions/communitiesAuthorsTitlesSubjectsThis institutionAuthorsTitlesSubjects

Statistics

View Usage Statistics

DSpace software copyright © 2002-2015  DuraSpace
About REFF | Send Feedback

OpenAIRERCUB