Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function
Abstract
G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.
Keywords:
Propositional attitudes / Moorean assertions / Knowledge-transmission / Eliminativism / AbsurditySource:
Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition, 2020, 35, 4, 531-541Publisher:
- Springer, Dordrecht
Funding / projects:
- Dynamic Systems in Nature and Society: Philosophical and Empirical Aspects (RS-MESTD-Basic Research (BR or ON)-179041)
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1
ISSN: 0353-5150
WoS: 000495932900001
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85075213715
Institution/Community
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Milevski, Voin PY - 2020 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3174 AB - G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function. PB - Springer, Dordrecht T2 - Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition T1 - Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function EP - 541 IS - 4 SP - 531 VL - 35 DO - 10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1 ER -
@article{ author = "Milevski, Voin", year = "2020", abstract = "G. E. Moore famously pointed out that all sincere assertions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p' are inherently absurd. John Turri strongly disagrees with the consensus evaluation of such assertions as inherently absurd and offers a counterexample according to which it is possible to say 'Eliminativism is true, but of course I don't believe it's true' sincerely and without any absurdity. I argue in this paper that Turri's attempt misses the point entirely, for the most natural interpretations of his counterexample are either absurd or do not represent genuinely Moorean assertions. The critical analysis of Turri's counterexample will enable me to reach the general conclusion that precludes the possibility of omissive Moorean assertions that are inherently non-absurd (regardless of their content), at least if we hold that our assertions ought to have some normative function.", publisher = "Springer, Dordrecht", journal = "Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition", title = "Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function", pages = "541-531", number = "4", volume = "35", doi = "10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1" }
Milevski, V.. (2020). Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function. in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition Springer, Dordrecht., 35(4), 531-541. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1
Milevski V. Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function. in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition. 2020;35(4):531-541. doi:10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1 .
Milevski, Voin, "Moorean Assertions and Their Normative Function" in Acta Analytica-International Periodical for Philosophy in the Analytical Tradition, 35, no. 4 (2020):531-541, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-019-00412-1 . .