Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World
Abstract
This paper deals with the discussions concerning the relationship between determinism and free will (i.e. the Problem of Compatibility), and correspondingly, with the implications for moral responsibility. It approaches the problem from the naturalistic perspective, albeit it does not answer the issue of the truth of causal determinism. For the sake of exploring the prospects for moral responsibility, the paper assumes causal determinism is scientifically warranted. Starting from the concept of causal determinism, the paper examines the challenges for the concept of free will as an ability to act otherwise, invoked by the Consequence Argument. The goal is to demonstrate that requirements for the ordinary moral responsibility conception are weaker than freedom as the ability to act otherwise. On these grounds, it is concluded that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible.
Keywords:
moral responsibility / free will / compatibilism / causal determinismSource:
Filozofska istraživanja, 2020, 40, 2, 313-328Publisher:
- Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb
Funding / projects:
DOI: 10.21464/fi40207
ISSN: 0351-4706
WoS: 000581924900008
Scopus: 2-s2.0-85094138474
Institution/Community
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Mijić, Jelena PY - 2020 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3200 AB - This paper deals with the discussions concerning the relationship between determinism and free will (i.e. the Problem of Compatibility), and correspondingly, with the implications for moral responsibility. It approaches the problem from the naturalistic perspective, albeit it does not answer the issue of the truth of causal determinism. For the sake of exploring the prospects for moral responsibility, the paper assumes causal determinism is scientifically warranted. Starting from the concept of causal determinism, the paper examines the challenges for the concept of free will as an ability to act otherwise, invoked by the Consequence Argument. The goal is to demonstrate that requirements for the ordinary moral responsibility conception are weaker than freedom as the ability to act otherwise. On these grounds, it is concluded that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible. PB - Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb T2 - Filozofska istraživanja T1 - Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World EP - 328 IS - 2 SP - 313 VL - 40 DO - 10.21464/fi40207 ER -
@article{ author = "Mijić, Jelena", year = "2020", abstract = "This paper deals with the discussions concerning the relationship between determinism and free will (i.e. the Problem of Compatibility), and correspondingly, with the implications for moral responsibility. It approaches the problem from the naturalistic perspective, albeit it does not answer the issue of the truth of causal determinism. For the sake of exploring the prospects for moral responsibility, the paper assumes causal determinism is scientifically warranted. Starting from the concept of causal determinism, the paper examines the challenges for the concept of free will as an ability to act otherwise, invoked by the Consequence Argument. The goal is to demonstrate that requirements for the ordinary moral responsibility conception are weaker than freedom as the ability to act otherwise. On these grounds, it is concluded that moral responsibility and causal determinism are compatible.", publisher = "Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb", journal = "Filozofska istraživanja", title = "Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World", pages = "328-313", number = "2", volume = "40", doi = "10.21464/fi40207" }
Mijić, J.. (2020). Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World. in Filozofska istraživanja Croatian Philosophical Soc, Zagreb., 40(2), 313-328. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40207
Mijić J. Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World. in Filozofska istraživanja. 2020;40(2):313-328. doi:10.21464/fi40207 .
Mijić, Jelena, "Moral Responsibility and the Scientific Image of the World" in Filozofska istraživanja, 40, no. 2 (2020):313-328, https://doi.org/10.21464/fi40207 . .