McDowell and Brandom on observational knowledge

dc.creator	Čukljević, Filip
dc.date.accessioned	2021-10-12T13:29:48Z
dc.date.available	2021-10-12T13:29:48Z
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.identifier.issn	0046-385X
dc.identifier.uri	http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3285
dc.description.abstract	In this paper, I will analyze whether John McDowell’s critique of Robert Brandom’s account of observational knowledge is a success. First, I will present Brandom’s view of observational knowledge. Then I will lay out the main objections that McDowell raises against it. I will argue that McDowell’s arguments can be divided into semantic and epistemic. The analysis will show that the epistemic arguments face serious difficulty and that McDowell should focus on semantic critique.	en
dc.publisher	Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Theatre and Film Research of the Center for Research in Art
dc.rights	restrictedAccess
dc.rights.uri	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.source	Filozofia
dc.subject	Reliability	en
dc.subject	Observational knowledge	en
dc.subject	Justification	en
dc.subject	Inference	en
dc.subject	Empirical content	en
dc.title	McDowell and Brandom on observational knowledge	en
dc.type	article
dc.rights.license	BY-NC
dc.citation.epage	435
dc.citation.issue	6
dc.citation.other	76(6): 423-435
dc.citation.spage	423
dc.citation.volume	76
dc.identifier.doi	10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3
dc.identifier.scopus	2-s2.0-85113225685
dc.identifier.wos	000708059800003
dc.type.version	publishedVersion