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Protiv deflacije subjekta iskustva

dc.creatorNešić, Janko
dc.date.accessioned2022-01-27T15:42:10Z
dc.date.available2022-01-27T15:42:10Z
dc.date.issued2017
dc.identifier.issn0353-5738
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3429
dc.description.abstractI will argue that accounts of mineness and pre-reflective self-awareness can be helpful to panpsychists in solving the combination problems. A common strategy in answering the subject combination problem in panpsychism is to deflate the subject, eliminating or reducing subjects to experience. Many modern panpsychist theories are deflationist or endorse deflationist accounts of subjects, such as Parfit’s reductionism of personal identity and G. Strawson’s identity view. To see if there can be deflation we need to understand what the subject/self is. One aspect of consciousness left unexplored and unappreciated by panpsychist theories is pre-reflective self-consciousness/self-awareness. Theories of the self, inspired by phenomenology, that are serious about subjectivity, could be of use in arguing against the deflationary reductionism of the experiencing subject. These theories show that there is more to the subject of experience than just its experiences (qualities). Even without arguing for any precise account of the nature of the self, it can be shown what phenomenology of subjective character of consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness contributes to the combination problem debate.sr
dc.description.abstractArgumentovaću da teorije subjektivnosti i prereflektivne samosvesti mogu biti od koristi onima koji zastupaju panpsihizam u boljem razumevanju prirode subjekata iskustva, a posredno, i pri rešavanju problema kombinacije. Na problem kombinacije subjekata, koji se stavlja pred panpsihistu, obično se odgovara “deflacijom”, subjekt se eliminiše ili svodi na sama iskustva. Mnoge moderne panpsihističke teorije su deflacionističke i zauzimaju reduktivno stanovište prema subjektivnosti. Značaj prereflektivne samosvesti, kao aspekta svesti, nije dovoljno priznat od strane panpsihista. Teorije sopstva, inspirisane fenomenologijom, koje brane postojanje subjektivnog aspekta svesti, mogu biti od značaja u argumentaciji protiv mogućnosti redukcije subjekata iskustva. Pokazaću kako fenomenologija subjektivnog karaktera svesti i prereflektivne samosvesti doprinosi debati o problem kombinacije subjekata u panpsihizmu.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherInstitut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beogradsr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceFilozofija i društvosr
dc.subjectdeflationsr
dc.subjectsubject of experiencesr
dc.subjectpanpsychismsr
dc.subjectcombination problemsr
dc.subjectpre-reflective self-awarenesssr
dc.subjectdeflacijasr
dc.subjectsubjekt iskustvasr
dc.subjectpanpsihizamsr
dc.subjectproblem kombinacijesr
dc.subjectpre-reflektivna samosvestsr
dc.titleAgainst Deflation of the Subjectsr
dc.titleProtiv deflacije subjekta iskustvasr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dc.citation.epage1121
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage1102
dc.citation.volume28
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/FID1704102N
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/7738/Janko.pdf
dc.identifier.wos000419105800005
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr


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