Vitgenštajnova kritika Frojda

Abstract

Cilj ovog rada je da se prikaže kritika koju Ludvig Vitgenštajn (Ludwig Wittgenstein) upućuje psihoanalitičkoj teoriji Sigmunda Frojda (Sigmund Freud), kao i da se kritički proceni njena uspešnost. Na početku ću izložiti neke od osnovnih argumenata koje Vitgenštajn nudi protiv ove teorije. Najpre ću razmotriti argument koji dovodi u pitanje psihoanalitičku ontologiju a prema kojem postoje bitni propusti u njenoj konceptualizaciji. Zatim ću se pozabaviti kritikom po kojoj je psihoanalitički metod problematičan, pre svega zbog njegove navodne nenaučnosti. Potom ću prikazati treći argument koji napada Frojdovu pretpostavku prema kojoj fenomeni poput snova moraju imati određenu suštinu. Pokazaće se da nijedan od ovih argumenata nije u potpunosti uspešan. Naposletku ću se fokusirati na, po nekima, glavni Vitgenštajnov argument prema kojem Frojd pravi grešku tako što ne razlikuje pojmove uzroka i razloga. Tvrdiću da se psihoanaliza može odbraniti i od ovog prigovora. Kako bih to pokazao, pozvaću se na tumačenje Frojdovog učenja prema kojem se u psihoanalizi koriste takozvana subintencionalna objašnjenja.

The aim of this paper is to present the critique that Ludwig Wittgenstein directs to the psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud, as well as to critically evaluate its successfulness. At the beginning I will review some of the main arguments that Wittgenstein offers against this theory. First I will consider the argument that calls into question the psychoanalytic ontology and according to which there are significant problems in its conceptualization. Then I will deal with the critique which holds that the psychoanalytic method is problematic, primarily because it is allegedly unscientific. After this I will show the third argument that attacks Freud’s assumption according to which phenomena such as dreams must have a certain essence. It will be shown that none of these arguments is entirely successful. Subsequently I will focus on the argument that is, according to some, the main Wittgenstein’s argument and according to which Freud makes a mistake by not distinguishing the concepts of cause and reason. I will claim that psychoanalysis can be defended from this objection likewise. In order to show this, I will refer to the interpretation of Freud’s teachings according to which the so-called subintentional explanations are used in psychoanalysis.