Dejvidson i Rorti o istini

Abstract

Cilj ovog rada je da se kompariraju shvatanja istine Donalda Dejvid- sona (Donald Davidson) i Ričarda Rortija (Richard Rorty). Prvo će se prikazati kritike koje ovi filozofi upućuju tradicionalnim shvatanjima istine. Zatim će se ispitati na koji način Rortijevo shvatanje istine predstavlja verziju deflatornog shvatanja istine. Sa druge strane, videćemo kako Dejvidson polazište za svoje shvatanje istine pronalazi u teoriji istine Tarskog. Razmatrajući njihove stavove o pojmu istine uzećemo u obzir i njihovu različitu metafilozofsku motivaciju. Naposletku, biće pokazano kako Dejvidson, za razliku od Rortija, na jedan odlučniji način prihvata realističko shvatanje istine.

The aim of this study is to compare the different understandings of truth provided by Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. First we will show how these philosophers criticise traditional notions of truth. We will then examine why Rorty’s understanding of truth is a version of the deflationary understanding of truth. On the other hand, we will see that Davidson finds the basis for his understanding of truth in the theory of truth offered by Tarski. While considering their views on the concept of truth we will take into account their different metaphilosophical motivations. Finally, it will be shown that Davidson, unlike Rorty, accepts a realistic understanding of the truth in a more decisive way.