Naučno saznanje i filozofija: slučaj moralne odgovornosti

Abstract

Kako u svakodnevnom životu tako i u pravu, većinu ljudi smatramo odgovornim za postupke pretpostavljajući da su to njihovi postupci, u smislu da nad njima imaju kontrolu. Pretpostavka koja dominira tradicionalnim filozofskim raspravama o moralnoj odgovornosti i teorijama kazne jeste da se osoba smatra moralno (pravno) odgovornom za počinjeni postupak ako taj postupak zavisi od nje na takav način da bi zaslužila osudu (kaznu), odnosno pohvalu (nagradu). Izazov koji prirodne nauke postavljaju pred ovakvo razumevanje moralne odgovornosti ne zaustavlja se na klasičnoj mehanici, već svoj novi, kompleksniji oblik zadobija pojavom kvantne mehanike, ali i razvojem neuronauke i psihologije. Relevantnost istraživanja prirodnih nauka za filozofske probleme objašnjavamo činjenicom da su drugu polovinu 20. veka obeležila naturalistička metafizička i epistemološka nastojanja. Na ovaj način je otvoreno novo poglavlje odnosa filozofije i prirodnih nauka, a mi ga u ovom radu ispitujemo kroz razmatranje problema kompatibilnosti determinizma i moralne odgovornosti. Cilj rada je da, ispitivanjem kako empirijskih argumenata kojima se u pitanje dovodi moralna odgovornost, tako i filozofskih argumenata koji figuriraju u ovim diskusijama, ukažemo da rezultati naučnih istraživanja mogu biti plodonosni u kontekstu rasprava o slobodi volje, moralne odgovornosti i teorija kazne, isključivo ako na adekvatan način komuniciraju sa rezultatima filozofskih istraživanja zasnovanim na primeni filozofskih metoda poput metoda pojmovne analize.

Both in everyday life and law, we hold most people responsible for their actions, assuming that they have control over them. The assumption that dominates traditional philosophical debates about moral responsibility and theories of punishment is that agents are morally (criminally) responsible for their actions if those actions depend on them in such a way that they would deserve blame (punishment) or praise (reward). In the Newtonian context, discussions on the concept of moral responsibility gain their prominence through compatibility problem: can one be morally responsible in a deterministic world? The challenge natural sciences pose to moral responsibility does not stop at classical mechanics, but acquires its new, more complex form due to quantum mechanics and the development of neuroscience and psychology. The relevance of natural science research for philosophical problems lies in the fact that the naturalistic metaphysical and epistemological efforts marked the second half of the 20th century. Naturalism is roughly defined as the view that philosophical research should be in accordance with the natural sciences. Thus began a new chapter of the relationship between philosophy and natural sciences, and we explore it in this paper by considering the problem of compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. This paper aims to examine not only the empirical arguments that call into question moral responsibility, but also to consider the philosophical arguments appearing in these discussions. Hopefully, those considerations will show that the results of scientific research might be fruitful in the context of discussions of free will, moral responsibility, and punishment theory, only if they concur with the philosophical results based on the application of methods such as the philosophical method of conceptual analysis.