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Believing under Coercion: Consideration of Locke’s Argument in Favor of Tolerance

dc.creatorKovačević, Miloš
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-22T20:50:10Z
dc.date.available2022-12-22T20:50:10Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.issn0351-2274
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4094
dc.description.abstractU radu razmatram Lokov argument u prilog verske tolerancije kojim se ističe iracionalnosti pokušaja države da utiče na promenu verovanja zato što je sam karakter verovanja takav da nije podložno sredstvima kojima država raspolaže. U prvom delu rada ću kroz pojmovnu analizu pokušati da pokažem da nasuprot uvreženom mišljenju da kauzalne veze između verovanja i nasilja nema, ipak nije sasvim nemoguće verovati pod prisilom u širem smislu te reči - kao intervencije koje zaobilaze racionalnost delatnika. U drugom delu rada fokus se pomera sa originalnog argumenta na njegovu revidiranu verziju u kojoj centralno mesto zauzima pojam autentičnosti. Umesto uzaludne potrage za verovanjima koja nisu proizvod nikakvog uticaja neophodno je bliže odrediti karakter kauzalne istorije koja generiše autentična verovanja. U skladu sa time, razvijam distinkciju između legitimnih i nelegitimnih uticaja koja treba da informiše savremeno promišljanje tolerancije.sr
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I consider Locke’s argument in favor of religious tolerance, which emphasizes the irrationality of the state’s attempts to influence the change of belief because the very character of belief is such that it is not susceptible to the state’s means. In the first part of the paper I will try to show using conceptual analysis that contrary to the common opinion that there is no causal connection between violence and believing, it is not entirely impossible to believe under coercion in the broader sense of the term - as an intervention that bypass the rationality of the agent. In the second part of the paper, the focus shifts from the original argument to its revised version in which the notion of authenticity takes a central place. Instead of a misdirected search for beliefs that are not the outcome of any influence, it is necessary to determine more closely the character of the causal history that generates authentic beliefs. Therefore, I develop Lockean distinction between legitimate and illegitimate influences, which ought to inform contemporary thinking about tolerance.sr
dc.language.isosrsr
dc.publisherSrpsko filozofsko društvo, Beogradsr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceTheoriasr
dc.subjecttolerancijasr
dc.subjectDžon Loksr
dc.subjectdržavasr
dc.subjectverovanjesr
dc.subjectprisilasr
dc.subjectautentičnostsr
dc.subjecttolerancesr
dc.subjectJohn Lockesr
dc.subjectstatesr
dc.subjectbeliefsr
dc.subjectcoercionsr
dc.subjectauthenticitysr
dc.titleVerovati pod prisilom: Razmatranje Lokovog argumenta u prilog tolerancijesr
dc.titleBelieving under Coercion: Consideration of Locke’s Argument in Favor of Tolerancesr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBYsr
dc.citation.epage76
dc.citation.issue4
dc.citation.rankM24
dc.citation.spage61
dc.citation.volume60
dc.identifier.doi10.2298/THEO2204061K
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/9855/0351-22742204061K.pdf
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr


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