What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist
Чланак у часопису (Објављена верзија)
Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
Naturalistic epistemology is usually associated with Quine’s turn from an a priori and traditional to a descriptive understanding of knowledge. In this paper, however, we will look at theories developed from Quine’s ideas - Millikan’s teleosemantics and Kornblith’s cognitive ethology. We will answer three questions: (i) Can a bee know?; (ii) What can a bee know?; and (iii) Does the bee know? First, we will answer the question of animal cognitive capacities using Kornblith’s understanding of the epistemic environment and the basic features of cognitive ethology. We will then set up teleosemantics as a framework in which Millikan attempts to naturalize intentional states and answer the question of the knowledge content in animals. By understanding natural signs and considering the non-propositional content of mental representations in animals, we will answer the third question and show how Kornblith and cognitive ethologists attempt to track the processes of forming reliable true beliefs... in different kinds of organisms. We will answer each of the three questions above by drawing on the research of apiologists and cognitive ethologists to provide empirical support for the theses of our work and so that we do not remain only on attempts, possible introductions, and anecdotes of naturalistic conceptions of knowledge, but provide concrete descriptions of the world and the place of knowledge in it.
Кључне речи:
Teleosemantics / biosemantics / cognitive ethology / apiology / Ruth Millikan / Hilary KornblithИзвор:
Theoria, 2022, 65, 33-59Издавач:
- Српско филозофско друштво
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Petar, Nurkić PY - 2022 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4266 AB - Naturalistic epistemology is usually associated with Quine’s turn from an a priori and traditional to a descriptive understanding of knowledge. In this paper, however, we will look at theories developed from Quine’s ideas - Millikan’s teleosemantics and Kornblith’s cognitive ethology. We will answer three questions: (i) Can a bee know?; (ii) What can a bee know?; and (iii) Does the bee know? First, we will answer the question of animal cognitive capacities using Kornblith’s understanding of the epistemic environment and the basic features of cognitive ethology. We will then set up teleosemantics as a framework in which Millikan attempts to naturalize intentional states and answer the question of the knowledge content in animals. By understanding natural signs and considering the non-propositional content of mental representations in animals, we will answer the third question and show how Kornblith and cognitive ethologists attempt to track the processes of forming reliable true beliefs in different kinds of organisms. We will answer each of the three questions above by drawing on the research of apiologists and cognitive ethologists to provide empirical support for the theses of our work and so that we do not remain only on attempts, possible introductions, and anecdotes of naturalistic conceptions of knowledge, but provide concrete descriptions of the world and the place of knowledge in it. PB - Српско филозофско друштво T2 - Theoria T1 - What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist EP - 59 SP - 33 VL - 65 DO - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204033N ER -
@article{ author = "Petar, Nurkić", year = "2022", abstract = "Naturalistic epistemology is usually associated with Quine’s turn from an a priori and traditional to a descriptive understanding of knowledge. In this paper, however, we will look at theories developed from Quine’s ideas - Millikan’s teleosemantics and Kornblith’s cognitive ethology. We will answer three questions: (i) Can a bee know?; (ii) What can a bee know?; and (iii) Does the bee know? First, we will answer the question of animal cognitive capacities using Kornblith’s understanding of the epistemic environment and the basic features of cognitive ethology. We will then set up teleosemantics as a framework in which Millikan attempts to naturalize intentional states and answer the question of the knowledge content in animals. By understanding natural signs and considering the non-propositional content of mental representations in animals, we will answer the third question and show how Kornblith and cognitive ethologists attempt to track the processes of forming reliable true beliefs in different kinds of organisms. We will answer each of the three questions above by drawing on the research of apiologists and cognitive ethologists to provide empirical support for the theses of our work and so that we do not remain only on attempts, possible introductions, and anecdotes of naturalistic conceptions of knowledge, but provide concrete descriptions of the world and the place of knowledge in it.", publisher = "Српско филозофско друштво", journal = "Theoria", title = "What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist", pages = "59-33", volume = "65", doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204033N" }
Petar, N.. (2022). What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist. in Theoria Српско филозофско друштво., 65, 33-59. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204033N
Petar N. What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist. in Theoria. 2022;65:33-59. doi:https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204033N .
Petar, Nurkić, "What Does a Bee Know? A Teleosemantic Framework for Cognitive Ethologist" in Theoria, 65 (2022):33-59, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO2204033N . .