Metaepistemologija između metodološkog naturalizma i standardne filozofske procedure

Abstract

U radu razmatramo duboku podelu među savremenim epistemolozima po pitanju ciljeva i metoda epistemologije. Okosnicu rada čini izazov koji tradicionalnom razumevanju filozofije postavljaju varijante naturalističkog pristupa epistemologiji od kojih je naradikalnija Kvajnov (Willard Van Orman Quine) naturalistički empirizam. Kvajnova kritika dovela je do skeptičkog stava u pogledu mogućnosti bavljenja epistemologijom iz fotelje. S druge strane, stav savremenih filozofa naklonih tradicionalnom pristupu filozofskim problemima je da epistemološki naturalizam ne opisuje adekvatno epistemološku praksu. Insistirajući na „standardnoj filozofskoj proceduri“, Biler (George Bealer) odbranu filozofije iz naslonjače temelji na upotrebi metoda pojmovne analize i metoda slučajeva u kojima centralno mesto zauzima pojam filozofskih intuicija. Naš cilj je da pokažemo da smeštanje metaepistemoloških rasprava u kontekst uloge filozofskih intuicija otvara prostor za pomirenje navodno sukobljenih pristupa filozofskom istraživanju znanja: naturalističkog i tradicionalnog.

This paper deals with the deep division of opinion among contemporary epistemologists on the aims and methods of epistemology.The backbone of the work is the challenge naturalistic approach to epistemology (Quine’s naturalistic empiricism represents it’s radical form), poses to the traditional understanding of philosophy. Quine’s criticism led to a skeptical stance towards the possibility of armchair epistemology. On the other hand, the attitude of contemporary philosophers fond of the traditional approach to philosophical problems is that epistemological naturalism does not adequately describe epistemological practice. By insisting on a “standard philosophical procedure”, Bealer bases his defense of armchair philosophy on the use of methods of conceptual analysis and method of cases, in which the notion of philosophical intuition plays a key role. Our aim is to show that placing metaepistemological debates in the context of the role of philosophical intuitions enables reconciliation between alledegly opposed, naturalistic and traditional approaches to philosophical inquiry into knowledge.