Poslednji makedonski pohod na Iran: jedna zaboravljena vojna revolucija?

Abstract

U radu se analizira važna ali uglavnom zaboravljena epizoda antičke vojne istorije: pohod seleukidskog kralja Antioha VII protiv novostvorene imperije Parta (dinastija Arsakida). Vođen 130. i 129. g. p.n.e., bio je to poslednji pokušaj makedonske dinastije Seleukida da sačuva položaj vodeće sile u zapadnoj Aziji, protiv rastuće moći Arsakida koji su postepeno ovladali Iranom, Mesopotamijom i delovima Centralne Azije. Izuzev što je označio definitivan kraj Seleukida kao velike sile, ovaj događaj je važan i zbog posledica koje je imao na partsku vojnu organizaciju i doktrinu. Početak rata bio je obeležen velikim neuspesima partske strane, gubicima bitaka, čitavih armija i velikih teritorija. Partski kralj Fraat II je izvukao odgovarajuće pouke iz poraza i prilagodio svoju vojsku novom načinu ratovanja: umesto vođenja velikih pozicionih bitaka, pobeda je ostvarena taktikom mobilnog rata, iscrpljivanjem neprijatelja i uništavanjem manjih i izolovanih delova njegove armije. U radu se brani teza da su promene do kojih je dovelo iskustvo imale karakter vojne revolucije koja je oblikovala potonji partski način ratovanja. Ovo je bio jedan od najvažnijih faktora u kasnijem partskom uspešnom otporu Rimljanima, a pre svega u najvećem trijumfu u njihovoj vojnoj istoriji: pobedi nad armijom Marka Licinija Krasa kod Kara, 53. g. p.n.e.

he campaign of the Seleucid king Antiochus VII led against the newly expanded empire of the Parthians (the Arsacid dynasty) is a very important, but largely forgotten episode of ancient military history. Conducted during 130 and 129 BC, it was the final attempt by the Macedonian dynasty of Seleucids to preserve its position as the leading power in Western Asia, against growing Arsacid might that gradually took control over Iran, Mesopotamia and parts of Central Asia. Apart from marking the definitive end of Seleucids as a great power, this event is noteworthy because of the consequences it had for the Parthian military organization and doctrine. The very beginning of the war was marked by massive defeats on the side of the Parthians, with battles, entire armies and regions lost. The Parthian king Phraates II learnt appropriate lessons from the defeat and reorganized what was left of his army for the type of warfare: instead of leading massive positional battles, the victory is to be won through maneuver warfare, exhaustion of the enemy and the elimination of the smaller and isolated parts of the hostile force. There is significant support for the claim that the changes brought on by this experience had a character of a true military revolution – a revolution that shaped the classical Parthian way of warfare. This was one of the most important factors for the later (and mostly successful) Parthian resistance to the Romans, and particularly in their greatest military triumph: the victory over the Army of Marcus Crassus at Carrhae in 53 BC.