Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu
Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Certainty and Scepticism
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Predmet ovog rada je Vitgenštajnovo razlikovanje i novo razumevanje pojmova znanja i izvesnosti u spisu O izvesnosti iz kojih proističe i njegova inovativna kritika skepticizma. On pokazuje da čitava rasprava o skepticizmu nastaje zato što i tradicionalni epistemolozi poput Mura i skeptik pogrešno shvataju prirodu takozvanih murovskih iskaza koji predstavljaju sadržaj naših osnovnih verovanja kao i naš stav prema njima. Vitgenštajn tvrdi da ovi iskazi nisu ni istiniti ni lažni već da funkcionišu poput pravila te da stoga ne mogu biti ni predmet znanja niti podložni sumnji. Naš stav prema njima nije epistemički već je odraz praktične sposobnosti učešća u jezičkoj praksi. Vitgenštajnov najubedljiviji i najoriginalniji argument protiv skepticizma pokazuje da skeptik, formulišući svoje sumnje, dovodi u pitanje sopstveno razumevanje reči kojima se pritom služi. Na kraju se tvrdi da sam Vitgenštajn zastupa jednu vrstu naturalizma hjumovskog tipa.
The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein’s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od
knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein’s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himse...lf endorses naturalism of a Humean type.
Кључне речи:
Vitgenštajn / murovski iskazi / znanje / izvesnost / skepticizam / naturalizam / Wittgenstein, / Moorean propositions / knowledge / certainty / scepticism / naturalismИзвор:
Theoria, 2016, 59, 3, 93-104Издавач:
- Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Davidović, Aleksandra PY - 2016 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4381 AB - Predmet ovog rada je Vitgenštajnovo razlikovanje i novo razumevanje pojmova znanja i izvesnosti u spisu O izvesnosti iz kojih proističe i njegova inovativna kritika skepticizma. On pokazuje da čitava rasprava o skepticizmu nastaje zato što i tradicionalni epistemolozi poput Mura i skeptik pogrešno shvataju prirodu takozvanih murovskih iskaza koji predstavljaju sadržaj naših osnovnih verovanja kao i naš stav prema njima. Vitgenštajn tvrdi da ovi iskazi nisu ni istiniti ni lažni već da funkcionišu poput pravila te da stoga ne mogu biti ni predmet znanja niti podložni sumnji. Naš stav prema njima nije epistemički već je odraz praktične sposobnosti učešća u jezičkoj praksi. Vitgenštajnov najubedljiviji i najoriginalniji argument protiv skepticizma pokazuje da skeptik, formulišući svoje sumnje, dovodi u pitanje sopstveno razumevanje reči kojima se pritom služi. Na kraju se tvrdi da sam Vitgenštajn zastupa jednu vrstu naturalizma hjumovskog tipa. AB - The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein’s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein’s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type. PB - Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd T2 - Theoria T1 - Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu T1 - Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Certainty and Scepticism EP - 104 IS - 3 SP - 93 VL - 59 DO - 10.2298/THEO1603093D ER -
@article{ author = "Davidović, Aleksandra", year = "2016", abstract = "Predmet ovog rada je Vitgenštajnovo razlikovanje i novo razumevanje pojmova znanja i izvesnosti u spisu O izvesnosti iz kojih proističe i njegova inovativna kritika skepticizma. On pokazuje da čitava rasprava o skepticizmu nastaje zato što i tradicionalni epistemolozi poput Mura i skeptik pogrešno shvataju prirodu takozvanih murovskih iskaza koji predstavljaju sadržaj naših osnovnih verovanja kao i naš stav prema njima. Vitgenštajn tvrdi da ovi iskazi nisu ni istiniti ni lažni već da funkcionišu poput pravila te da stoga ne mogu biti ni predmet znanja niti podložni sumnji. Naš stav prema njima nije epistemički već je odraz praktične sposobnosti učešća u jezičkoj praksi. Vitgenštajnov najubedljiviji i najoriginalniji argument protiv skepticizma pokazuje da skeptik, formulišući svoje sumnje, dovodi u pitanje sopstveno razumevanje reči kojima se pritom služi. Na kraju se tvrdi da sam Vitgenštajn zastupa jednu vrstu naturalizma hjumovskog tipa., The subject of this paper is Wittgenstein’s distinction and new undestarnding of the concepts od knowledge and certainty in On certainty from which also follows his novel critique od scepticism. He shows that the whole debate on skepticism arises because both the traditional epistemologists like Moore and the skeptic misunderstand the nature of the so-called Moorean propositions which represent the content of our basic beliefs and our attitude towards them. Wittgenstein claims that these propositions are neither true nor false but that they function as rules and hence cannot be known or subject to doubt. Our attitude towards them is not epistemic but is rather a reflection of our practical ability to participate in linguistic practice. Wittgenstein’s most convincing and most original argument against scepticism demonstrates that the skeptic, in forming her doubts, brings into question her own understanding of the words she thereby uses. In the end it is claimed that Wittgenstein himself endorses naturalism of a Humean type.", publisher = "Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd", journal = "Theoria", title = "Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu, Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Certainty and Scepticism", pages = "104-93", number = "3", volume = "59", doi = "10.2298/THEO1603093D" }
Davidović, A.. (2016). Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu. in Theoria Srpsko filozofsko društvo, Beograd., 59(3), 93-104. https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1603093D
Davidović A. Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu. in Theoria. 2016;59(3):93-104. doi:10.2298/THEO1603093D .
Davidović, Aleksandra, "Vitgenštajn o znanju, izvesnosti i skepticizmu" in Theoria, 59, no. 3 (2016):93-104, https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1603093D . .