Приказ основних података о документу

dc.contributorDajč, Haris
dc.contributorJarić, Isidora
dc.contributorDobrovšak, Ljiljana
dc.creatorSamardžić, Nikola
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-05T10:31:31Z
dc.date.available2023-05-05T10:31:31Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.isbn978-953-8404-16-0
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4398
dc.description.abstractRussia’s relations with the EU and NATO, and the candidate states, were based on the idea of undermining liberal democracy by supporting populist leaders and movements, in order to and renew Russia’s political and strategic influence in Eastern and Central Europe. The Second Cold War between Russia and the West was announced already during the 1999 NATO intervention in Serbia and Montenegro. Russia has failed to stop NATO and EU enlargement, and decided to carry out hybrid actions using corruption of the Western political and business establishment, and campaigns of deception and lies in the media and social networks. The weaknesses in EU foreign and security policy, after 2008, and obviously since 2012, enabled Russia to establish three points of strategic pressure in response to EU and NATO enlargement in Eastern and South-eastern Europe: Baltic, Ukraine and Western Balkans. Simultaneously, Russia affected gradual rejection of the EU values and standards within the Visegrád Group states. Every major populist leader and movement in EU member states enjoyed official Russia’s support. Successful EU integration of Eastern European states 2004—2007 was followed by political, financial and strategic crises (2008 finansial crisis, 2014 Ukraine, 2015 migrant crisis, 2016 Brexit). While EU was giving weak and hesitant answers, WB states were becoming objects of malign influences of Russia, China and Turkey. In general perspective, none of the EU strategic objectives have been achieved: Russia has not become a democratic state, WB were not fully integrated in the EU. Russia has also managed to secure secure economic and political strongholds in Hungary and Croatia, and produce political confusion in Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Albania, especially manipulating the Kosovo crisis. Kosovo was another EU failure of a poor leadership and weak political authority. Here are particularly underlined patterns of disinformation campaigns ran by Russian state agency Sputnik.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherInstitute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilarsr
dc.relationNo 822682 POPREBEL: Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo.feudalismsr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.sourceContemporary Populism and its Political Consequences. Discourses and Practices in Central and South-Eastern Europesr
dc.subjectRussiasr
dc.subjecthybrid warsr
dc.subjectpopulismsr
dc.subjectWestern Balkanssr
dc.subjectEU Foreign and Security Policysr
dc.titleRussia and Western Balkans 1999—2019. The Rise of Populism and Hybrid Warfaresr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBYsr
dc.citation.epage116
dc.citation.spage91
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/10801/bitstream_10801.pdf
dc.identifier.rcubhttps://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_4398
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr


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Приказ основних података о документу