The role of thought experiments and conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy

Abstract

Analytic philosophy is a philosophical tradition characterized by analysis as its method. The method of analysis may be taken as conceptual or linguistic analysis. The result of conceptual analysis takes the form of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions or a definition. Thought experiments play an important role in testing the proposed definitions or theories. Thus conceived methodology often receives criticism. The main target of critique is philosophical intuition as an answer to the thought experiment. One prong of criticism calls for a revision of the philosophical methodology by questioning the reliability of intuitions as responses to thought experiments. The other, more traditional prong of critique states that intuitions are not a part of philosophical practice at all. The paper aims to show that these critiques are not fatal to the standard procedure in analytic philosophy, primarily because the critics overlook the various roles thought experiments play in philosophy. We argue that the evidential force we attribute to intuitions depends on whether the thought experiment plays an illustrative, pedagogical, provocative, or counterexample role.