Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism
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Recently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldhaber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s attack, namely John Campbell’s (2002a, 2002b, 2011a) relationism. I will reexamine the Burge/Campbell debate concerning the role of perceptual psychology in theorizing about the nature of perception and the status of perceptual beliefs so that I can support Goldhaber’s stance that Burge’s plan to put the kibosh on disjunctivism backfires in the end. Finally, by using the challenge of cognitiv...e penetrability, I show how Burge’s argumentation strategy can be turned against him.
Keywords:
Cognitive penetrability / Disjunctivism / Perceptual beliefs / Perceptual demonstratives / Perceptual psychology / Rationality / RelationismSource:
Prolegomena, 06-2023, 22, 1, 5-26Institution/Community
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Subotić, Vanja PY - 2023-06 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4926 AB - Recently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldhaber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s attack, namely John Campbell’s (2002a, 2002b, 2011a) relationism. I will reexamine the Burge/Campbell debate concerning the role of perceptual psychology in theorizing about the nature of perception and the status of perceptual beliefs so that I can support Goldhaber’s stance that Burge’s plan to put the kibosh on disjunctivism backfires in the end. Finally, by using the challenge of cognitive penetrability, I show how Burge’s argumentation strategy can be turned against him. T2 - Prolegomena T1 - Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism EP - 26 IS - 1 SP - 5 VL - 22 DO - https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101 ER -
@article{ author = "Subotić, Vanja", year = "2023-06", abstract = "Recently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldhaber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s attack, namely John Campbell’s (2002a, 2002b, 2011a) relationism. I will reexamine the Burge/Campbell debate concerning the role of perceptual psychology in theorizing about the nature of perception and the status of perceptual beliefs so that I can support Goldhaber’s stance that Burge’s plan to put the kibosh on disjunctivism backfires in the end. Finally, by using the challenge of cognitive penetrability, I show how Burge’s argumentation strategy can be turned against him.", journal = "Prolegomena", title = "Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism", pages = "26-5", number = "1", volume = "22", doi = "https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101" }
Subotić, V.. (2023-06). Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism. in Prolegomena, 22(1), 5-26. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101
Subotić V. Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism. in Prolegomena. 2023;22(1):5-26. doi:https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101 .
Subotić, Vanja, "Misfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivism" in Prolegomena, 22, no. 1 (2023-06):5-26, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.26362/20230101 . .