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dc.creatorSubotić, Vanja
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-09T13:09:18Z
dc.date.available2023-10-09T13:09:18Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/4926
dc.description.abstractRecently, Charles Goldhaber (2019) has argued that Tyler Burge’s (2005, 2010, 2011) arguments against disjunctivism in the philosophy of perception fail when juxtaposed with the literature in perceptual psychology. In addition, Goldhaber traces Burge’s motives for dismissing disjunctivism: his underlying theoretical assumptions vis-à-vis human rationality virtually force him to maintain that there is a genuine inconsistency between disjunctivism and perceptual psychology. While Goldhaber aims to defend epistemological disjunctivism à la John McDowell, my concern will be the other target of Burge’s attack, namely John Campbell’s (2002a, 2002b, 2011a) relationism. I will reexamine the Burge/Campbell debate concerning the role of perceptual psychology in theorizing about the nature of perception and the status of perceptual beliefs so that I can support Goldhaber’s stance that Burge’s plan to put the kibosh on disjunctivism backfires in the end. Finally, by using the challenge of cognitive penetrability, I show how Burge’s argumentation strategy can be turned against him.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.rightsopenAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
dc.sourceProlegomenasr
dc.subjectCognitive penetrabilitysr
dc.subjectDisjunctivismsr
dc.subjectPerceptual beliefssr
dc.subjectPerceptual demonstrativessr
dc.subjectPerceptual psychologysr
dc.subjectRationalitysr
dc.subjectRelationismsr
dc.titleMisfiring: Tyler Burge Contra Disjunctivismsr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NCsr
dc.citation.epage26
dc.citation.issue1
dc.citation.spage5
dc.citation.volume22
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.26362/20230101
dc.identifier.fulltexthttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/bitstream/id/12097/19333F92-0AF6-11EE-925E-F8CB3FDF8FE5.pdf
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionsr


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