O razumljivosti slabosti volje

Abstract

U ovom članku se razmatra problem razumevanja slučajeva nesuzdržljivosti kao paradigmatičnih slučajeva iracionalnog ponašanja. Nasuprot shvatanju da slabost volje logički nije moguća, autor ukazuje da postoje njeni istinski slučajevi. Zastupajući tezu da je slabost volje razumljiva kao snižena racionalnost, autor analizira njene pojmovne, empirijske, subjektivne i etičke aspekte.

This paper deals with the problem of understanding of cases of incontinency as paradigmatic cases of irrational behavior. Contrary to the opinion that weakness of will is logical impossible, the author points out that there are its genuine cases. Supporting the thesis of intelligibility of incontinency as reduced rationality, the author analyzes its conceptual, empirical subjective and ethical aspects.