The Procedural Value of Epistemic Virtues

Abstract

The longstanding tension between the procedural and instrumental justification of democracy has been challenged by the theories that try to combine both approaches. These theories portray epistemic features of democracy in an instrumental framework and then try to reconcile them with procedural values. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to incorporate an epistemic dimension into a justification of democracy, without resorting to instrumentalism. On the view that I advance, Peircean epistemology, when combined with intrinsically valued epistemic virtues, constitutes a purely procedural argument for democracy.

Dugo prisutna tenzija između proceduralnog i instrumentalnog opravdanja demokratije dovedena je u pitanje pojavom teorija koje pokušavaju da objedine oba pristupa. Ove teorije predstavljaju epistemičke odlike demokratije u instrumentalnom okviru, a potom pokušavaju da ih pomire sa proceduralnim vrednostima. U ovom tekstu tvrdim da je moguće uključiti epistemičku dimenziju u opravdanje demokratije bez obavezivanja na instrumentalizam. Prema gledištu koje zastupam, persovska epistemologija spojena sa epistemičkim vrlinama kojima se pripisuje intrinsična vrednost daje čisto proceduralni argument u prilog demokratije.