Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy
Kondorseova teorema porote: Opšta volja i epistemička demokratija
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My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to this day. In the second part I will specify the purposes of the theorem itself, and examine its underlying assumptions. Third part will be about an interpretation of Rousseau’s theory, which is given by Grofman and Feld relying on Condorcet’s jury theorem, and about criticisms of such interpretation. In the fourth, and last, part I will focus on one particular assumption of Condorcet’s theorem, which proves to be especially problematic if we would like to apply the theorem under real-life conditions; namely, the assum...ption that voters choose between two options only.
Moj cilj u ovom radu je da objasnim šta je Kondorseova teorema porote,
ispitam njene glavne pretpostavke, njen značaj za epistemičku teoriju demokratije i
njenu vezu sa Rusoovom teorijom o opštoj volji. U prvom delu rada ću izložiti šta
predstavlja epistemička demokratija, i na koji način je Kondorseova teorema porote
sa njom dvostruko povezana: kao istorijski izvor koji joj ide u prilog, i kao jedan od
modela na koje se autori i danas oslanjaju. U drugom delu ću objasniti u čemu se
sastoji sama teorema i ispitati pretpostavke koje leže u njenoj pozadini. Treći deo će
biti posvećen interpretaciji Rusoove teorije koju su, oslanjajući se na Kondorseovu
teoremu porote, ponudili Grofman i Feld, i kritikama na račun takve interpretacije.
U četvrtom, ujedno i poslednjem, delu ću se posebno osvrnuti na jednu od pretpostavki
Kondorseove teoreme koja se pokazuje kao posebno problematična ako bismo želeli
da govorimo o njenoj primenljivosti na realne uslove, a to je da u njenom klasič...nom
obliku glasači vrše izbor između samo dve opcije.
Кључне речи:
Competence / Epistemic democracy / Condorcet's jury theorem / General will / Kompetencija / Epistemička demokratija / Kondorseova teorema porote / Opšta volja / Pretpostavka binarnostiИзвор:
Theoria, 2018, 61, 4, 147-170Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Vasić, Miljan PY - 2018 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5891 AB - My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to this day. In the second part I will specify the purposes of the theorem itself, and examine its underlying assumptions. Third part will be about an interpretation of Rousseau’s theory, which is given by Grofman and Feld relying on Condorcet’s jury theorem, and about criticisms of such interpretation. In the fourth, and last, part I will focus on one particular assumption of Condorcet’s theorem, which proves to be especially problematic if we would like to apply the theorem under real-life conditions; namely, the assumption that voters choose between two options only. AB - Moj cilj u ovom radu je da objasnim šta je Kondorseova teorema porote, ispitam njene glavne pretpostavke, njen značaj za epistemičku teoriju demokratije i njenu vezu sa Rusoovom teorijom o opštoj volji. U prvom delu rada ću izložiti šta predstavlja epistemička demokratija, i na koji način je Kondorseova teorema porote sa njom dvostruko povezana: kao istorijski izvor koji joj ide u prilog, i kao jedan od modela na koje se autori i danas oslanjaju. U drugom delu ću objasniti u čemu se sastoji sama teorema i ispitati pretpostavke koje leže u njenoj pozadini. Treći deo će biti posvećen interpretaciji Rusoove teorije koju su, oslanjajući se na Kondorseovu teoremu porote, ponudili Grofman i Feld, i kritikama na račun takve interpretacije. U četvrtom, ujedno i poslednjem, delu ću se posebno osvrnuti na jednu od pretpostavki Kondorseove teoreme koja se pokazuje kao posebno problematična ako bismo želeli da govorimo o njenoj primenljivosti na realne uslove, a to je da u njenom klasičnom obliku glasači vrše izbor između samo dve opcije. T2 - Theoria T1 - Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy T1 - Kondorseova teorema porote: Opšta volja i epistemička demokratija EP - 170 IS - 4 SP - 147 VL - 61 DO - https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1804147V ER -
@article{ author = "Vasić, Miljan", year = "2018", abstract = "My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to this day. In the second part I will specify the purposes of the theorem itself, and examine its underlying assumptions. Third part will be about an interpretation of Rousseau’s theory, which is given by Grofman and Feld relying on Condorcet’s jury theorem, and about criticisms of such interpretation. In the fourth, and last, part I will focus on one particular assumption of Condorcet’s theorem, which proves to be especially problematic if we would like to apply the theorem under real-life conditions; namely, the assumption that voters choose between two options only., Moj cilj u ovom radu je da objasnim šta je Kondorseova teorema porote, ispitam njene glavne pretpostavke, njen značaj za epistemičku teoriju demokratije i njenu vezu sa Rusoovom teorijom o opštoj volji. U prvom delu rada ću izložiti šta predstavlja epistemička demokratija, i na koji način je Kondorseova teorema porote sa njom dvostruko povezana: kao istorijski izvor koji joj ide u prilog, i kao jedan od modela na koje se autori i danas oslanjaju. U drugom delu ću objasniti u čemu se sastoji sama teorema i ispitati pretpostavke koje leže u njenoj pozadini. Treći deo će biti posvećen interpretaciji Rusoove teorije koju su, oslanjajući se na Kondorseovu teoremu porote, ponudili Grofman i Feld, i kritikama na račun takve interpretacije. U četvrtom, ujedno i poslednjem, delu ću se posebno osvrnuti na jednu od pretpostavki Kondorseove teoreme koja se pokazuje kao posebno problematična ako bismo želeli da govorimo o njenoj primenljivosti na realne uslove, a to je da u njenom klasičnom obliku glasači vrše izbor između samo dve opcije.", journal = "Theoria", title = "Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy, Kondorseova teorema porote: Opšta volja i epistemička demokratija", pages = "170-147", number = "4", volume = "61", doi = "https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1804147V" }
Vasić, M.. (2018). Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy. in Theoria, 61(4), 147-170. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1804147V
Vasić M. Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy. in Theoria. 2018;61(4):147-170. doi:https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1804147V .
Vasić, Miljan, "Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy" in Theoria, 61, no. 4 (2018):147-170, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.2298/THEO1804147V . .