Lajbnicova kritika kartezijanskih principa kretanja

Abstract

Brzina tela u kretanju paradigmatski je primer vektorske veličine. U ovom članku obrazlaže se da je ovakvo shvatanje brzine prvobitno uveo Lajbnic u kontekstu kritike kartezijanskih principa kretanja. U kartezijanskoj metafizici brzina tela je strogo pozitivna skalarna veličina, nezavisna od njegovog smera kretanja. Usled sudara, telo može da promeni smer kretanja zadržavajući pri tom svoju brzinu ovakva promena neposredno bi opovrgla princip kontinuiteta. Da bi sačuvao princip kontinuiteta, Lajbnic je revidirao pojam brzine, a smer kretanja redukovao na klasu novouvedene usmerene brzine. Dalje se pokazuje da u Lajbnicovoj metafizici nisu dopuštena negativna svojstva. Kako bi uskladio princip kontinuiteta sa očiglednim skokovima, Lajbnic je bio prinuđen da porekne postojanje atoma: on je tvrdio da monade, ili pravi elementi stvari, moraju biti nematerijalne i nepropadljive.

Velocity of a moving body is a paradigmatic case of vector. In this paper it is argued that this conception of velocity was originally introduced by Leibniz in the context of his critique of Cartesian principles of motion. In Cartesian metaphysics velocity of a moving body is a strictly positive scalar, independent from its direction. As a result of an impact, a body can change its direction and preserve its velocity; such a change would immediately falsify the principle of continuity. In order to save the principle of continuity, Leibniz revised the notion of velocity and reduced the direction of movement to a class of newly conceived directed velocity. It is further shown that negative properties are not allowed in Leibnizian metaphysics. To reconcile the principle of continuity with apparent leaps, Leibniz was forced to deny the existence of atoms: he claimed that the monads, or the true elements of things, had to be indestructible and immaterial.