Aristotelov metafizički pojam logosa

Abstract

The paper discusses the notion of logos in Aristotle's first philosophy by considering particularly its relation with the primary and central metaphysical concept, which is oÙs…a. Aristotle envisages the relation between logos and oÙs…a, using the homonymy of the logos, in order to link the epistemological question of defining the substance (lÒgoj tÁj oÙs…aj) with the ontological question of the realization of form (e‹doj or lÒgoj) in matter. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle alters the doctrine of primary and secondary substances elaborated in the Categories in favor of a more complex ontology of hylomorphic structure of perceptible, concrete substances. This does not imply that he no longer considers individual things as substances, but that he inquires whether matter or form of those things is substantial. One of the replies to this question could be found in Aristotle's doctrine of definition (logos). Like Socrates and Plato, Aristotle also holds that a definition is a specification of the essence of a thing and that the essence of a thing is its form. In the case of material things, strictly speaking, only their form is a subject of the definition (logos), but form in its special relation with the matter in which it is realized. Aristotle's stance on the relation of the logos and e‹doj has important ontological and epistemological consequences. The ontological consequence is that a certain thing is primarily its own form, because it is the form that determines the nature and identity of each individual thing. The epistemological consequence is that, in a scientific study of perceptible, material things, central importance will be given precisely to formal aspects of these things, such as the organization of material components, their deeper structure, the interrelations of elements etc. .