Internalizam i problem izolovane epistemičke zajednice

Abstract

Ovaj rad bavi se jednim od karakterističnih vidova relativizma sa kojim se suočava internalističko shvatanje epistemičkog opravdanja. U literaturi se taj problem obično naziva problemom izolovane epistemičke zajednice. Na jednom zamišljenom primeru ilustrovana je priroda ovog problema, da bi se na kraju pokazalo da internalizam ne može da pruži celovito i dosledno tumačenje prirode epistemičkog opravdanja, odnosno da se mora pribeći izvesnim eksternalističkim pretpostavkama koje se, pre svega, tiču zahteva da opravdanje obezbedi adekvatnu vezu između verovanja i istine.

In this paper the author deals with one form of relativism which stems from the internalist account of epistemic justification. In the recent epistemological literature this form of relativism is usually indicated as the problem of an isolated epistemic community. By way of an example concerning an isolated epistemic community, it is shown that internalism is unable to provide a consistent account of epistemic justification due to the fact that internalist justification cannot secure the objective connection between beliefs and truth making it the case that one's epistemically justified belief is likely to be true. That means that in explaining epistemic justification we have to resort to some externalist requirements.