Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje
Gods foreknowledge and free will
Апстракт
Theologians and any philosophers have reasoned that god exist, and that god since he is omniscient, knows what is going to happen in the future. If god knows what we will do in the future, then we can no choose to do anything other than what god knows we will do. If we can not choose to do anything differently than what god knows we will do, we can not choose freely - we have not a free will. It is, in short, argument of the theological determinism or fatalism. From many theological reasons theologians and any philosophers are needed for a humane free will. In this paper we will discuss that resolutions in which god's for knowledge of the future is compatible with the freedom of human actions. We will consider resolutions of Augustine Boethius, and Thomas Aquines. All these resolutions are based on the assumption of God's timelessly eternity and knowledge.
Извор:
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 2008, 21, 81-94Издавач:
- Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd
Институција/група
Filozofija / PhilosophyTY - JOUR AU - Đurić, Drago PY - 2008 UR - http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/783 AB - Theologians and any philosophers have reasoned that god exist, and that god since he is omniscient, knows what is going to happen in the future. If god knows what we will do in the future, then we can no choose to do anything other than what god knows we will do. If we can not choose to do anything differently than what god knows we will do, we can not choose freely - we have not a free will. It is, in short, argument of the theological determinism or fatalism. From many theological reasons theologians and any philosophers are needed for a humane free will. In this paper we will discuss that resolutions in which god's for knowledge of the future is compatible with the freedom of human actions. We will consider resolutions of Augustine Boethius, and Thomas Aquines. All these resolutions are based on the assumption of God's timelessly eternity and knowledge. PB - Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd T2 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual T1 - Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje T1 - Gods foreknowledge and free will EP - 94 IS - 21 SP - 81 UR - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_783 ER -
@article{ author = "Đurić, Drago", year = "2008", abstract = "Theologians and any philosophers have reasoned that god exist, and that god since he is omniscient, knows what is going to happen in the future. If god knows what we will do in the future, then we can no choose to do anything other than what god knows we will do. If we can not choose to do anything differently than what god knows we will do, we can not choose freely - we have not a free will. It is, in short, argument of the theological determinism or fatalism. From many theological reasons theologians and any philosophers are needed for a humane free will. In this paper we will discuss that resolutions in which god's for knowledge of the future is compatible with the freedom of human actions. We will consider resolutions of Augustine Boethius, and Thomas Aquines. All these resolutions are based on the assumption of God's timelessly eternity and knowledge.", publisher = "Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd", journal = "Belgrade Philosophical Annual", title = "Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje, Gods foreknowledge and free will", pages = "94-81", number = "21", url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_783" }
Đurić, D.. (2008). Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual Univerzitet u Beogradu - Filozofski fakultet - Institut za filozofiju, Beograd.(21), 81-94. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_783
Đurić D. Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje. in Belgrade Philosophical Annual. 2008;(21):81-94. https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_783 .
Đurić, Drago, "Teološki determinizam i sloboda volje" in Belgrade Philosophical Annual, no. 21 (2008):81-94, https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_reff_783 .