Moralno osećanje kod Čarlsa Darvina

Abstract

Na početku rada biće prikazan Darvinov pristup nauci. To će biti ilustrovano modalitetom njegovih osnovnih tvrdnji i načinom ocenjivanja vrednosti svoje vlastite teorije. Potom će biti prikazana četiri osnovne pretpostavke koje on smatra značajnim za očuvanje i evoluciju moralnog osećanja. Nakon toga će biti razmotreno pitanje odnosa između nasleđenih i stečenih moralnih svojstava i osnovnih karakteristika koje, prema Darvinu, sačinjavaju razliku između socijalnog instinkta kod nižih životinja i moralnog osećanja kod čoveka. Na kraju će biti ponuđeni neki argumenti za tezu da u evolucionom naučnom pristupu etici nema mesta za nepremostivi jaz između činjenica i vrednosti, 'treba' i 'jeste', i neki argumenti za tezu da sa tačke gledišta teorije evolucije možemo imati deskriptivnu etiku, ali nikakvu preskriptivnu ili normativnu etiku, sem predviđanja da neka moralna uverenja i ponašanja mogu biti evoluciono uspešna.

At the beginning of this paper Darwin's approach to science will be presented. This will be illustrated with his own modality of his main claims and modesty he had shown in evaluating the worth of his theory. Than we shall present his four suppositions important for preservation and evolution of moral sense. After that we will consider the issue of relation between inherited and acquired moral properties and main characteristics which according to Darwin, make difference between social instinct in lower animals and moral sense in man. At the end some we shall present some arguments for thesis that in evolutionary scientific approach to ethics there is no room for unbridgeable gap between facts and values, 'ought' and 'is', and some arguments for thesis that from the point of view of the theory of evolution we can have descriptive ethics, but not any prescriptive or normative ethics except predictions that some moral beliefs and behaviors can be evolutionary successful.