'Zašto' svêsti, teorijski jaz i teorija dvostrukog aspekta

Abstract

U prvom delu rada, govoriću o debati koja se vodi u filozofiji duha između, da se poslužimo Čalmersovim izrazom, zastupnika teškog problema svesti i onih koji to poriču. Taj jaz se često (vidi recimo Hardcastle 1996) smatra nepremostivim. Ove dve grupe filozofa nazvaću, tim redosledom, nereduktivistima i reduktivistima. U drugom delu rada izneću jednu specifičnu vrstu kritike uperene protiv reduktivista - ukratko to da oni neispravno pretpostavljaju razrešenje spora između pesimističkih i optimističkih induktivista. Tvrdiću da takva pretpostavka ne bi trebalo da se napravi i da sve dok se ovaj spor zaista ne razreši, ili barem ne ponudi neko rešenje u okviru filozofije duha, imamo osnova da budemo skeptični u pogledu reduktivizma. U trećem delu rada predložiću jedan mogući put ka rešenju prve debate koje bi sugerisalo da jaz između dve strane ipak nije nepremostiv.

In the first part of this paper I will outline the debate in philosophy of mind between those who, to borrow from Chalmers (Chalmers 1996) recognize the existence of the hard problem of consciousness and between those who do not. I will call the two groups non-reductivists and reductivists, respectively. The second part will put forward a specific type of criticism against reductivists - in short that its proponents incorrectly assume the resolution of another dispute, the one between the so-called pessimistic and optimistic inductivists. It will be claimed that such an assumption should not be made, and that until the latter debate is settled, or at least until a specific solution is offered within the context of the philosophy of mind, we have every right to be skeptical towards reductivist attempts. In the third part of the paper I will propose a possible solution which might offer some hope of finding the middle ground between the two sides.