Приказ основних података о документу
McDowell and Brandom on observational knowledge
dc.creator | Čukljević, Filip | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2021-10-12T13:29:48Z | |
dc.date.available | 2021-10-12T13:29:48Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0046-385X | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/3285 | |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper, I will analyze whether John McDowell’s critique of Robert Brandom’s account of observational knowledge is a success. First, I will present Brandom’s view of observational knowledge. Then I will lay out the main objections that McDowell raises against it. I will argue that McDowell’s arguments can be divided into semantic and epistemic. The analysis will show that the epistemic arguments face serious difficulty and that McDowell should focus on semantic critique. | en |
dc.publisher | Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of Theatre and Film Research of the Center for Research in Art | |
dc.rights | restrictedAccess | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ | |
dc.source | Filozofia | |
dc.subject | Reliability | en |
dc.subject | Observational knowledge | en |
dc.subject | Justification | en |
dc.subject | Inference | en |
dc.subject | Empirical content | en |
dc.title | McDowell and Brandom on observational knowledge | en |
dc.type | article | |
dc.rights.license | BY-NC | |
dc.citation.epage | 435 | |
dc.citation.issue | 6 | |
dc.citation.other | 76(6): 423-435 | |
dc.citation.spage | 423 | |
dc.citation.volume | 76 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.6.3 | |
dc.identifier.scopus | 2-s2.0-85113225685 | |
dc.identifier.wos | 000708059800003 | |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion |