Konsenzus i poverenje u nauku: uvidi u oblasti socijalne epistemologije primenjeni u analizi socijalnog epistemičkog ponašanja u doba krize izazvane virusom korona (SARS-COV-2)

Abstract

U prvom delu ovog rada je rekonstruisana problematika u oblasti socijalne epistemologije koja se vezuje za pojam konsenzusa, dok u drugom autorka pokušava da utvrdi na koji bi se način ona mogla upotrebiti u analizi epistemičke prakse u vreme krize izazvane pandemijom virusa korona. Preciznije rečeno, dok prvi deo rada pokazuje zbog čega je epistemičko opravdanje konsenzusa jedno filozofski zanimljivo pitanje, drugi se usredsređuje na njegove praktične posledice: da li je konsenzus relevantan za poverenje građana u sudove eksperata i uspešno kreiranje politika na njihovoj pozadini? Dok je većina teoretičara u oblasti socijalne epistemologije nauke saglasna da su neslaganja unutar naučne zajednice epistemički stimulativna, postoji čitav niz argumenata kojima se naglašava njihovo razorno dejstvo. Pre svega, ističe se da veliki sporovi negativno utiču na percepciju naučne zajednice, da podrivaju poverenje u naučne sudove, te samim tim, i motivaciju za poštovanje preporuka eksperata za prevazilaženje postojećih izazova. U radu se sugeriše da ovi prigovori nisu dobro zasnovani i brani se stav da se pitanje o naučnom konsenzusu i pitanje poverenja u nauku mogu razdvojiti.

The first part of this paper deals with problems in social epistemology regarding the concept of consensus, while the second part aims to ascertain in what way this could be applied on analyzing epistemic practices in the time of the COVID-19 crisis. More precisely, while the first part of the paper shows why considering the epistemic status of consensus is a philosophically interesting endeavor, the second part focuses on its practical consequences: is the existence of a consensus, and to what extent, a relevant factor in citizens’ trust in the judgement of experts and in public policy? While most theorists in social epistemology of science agree that disagreement within the scientific community is epistemically stimulative, there exists a whole set of arguments emphasizing its destructive capacity. It is argued that public disputes negatively impact the perception of the scientific community; that they undermine trust in science, in doing so, also reduce our motivation for adherence to recommendations of experts. The paper suggests that these objections are poorly founded, and argues for the position that questions of scientific consensus and trust in science can be separated.