Приказ основних података о документу

dc.creatorVasić, Miljan
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-18T19:55:16Z
dc.date.available2023-11-10
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.urihttp://reff.f.bg.ac.rs/handle/123456789/5346
dc.description.abstractThe “diversity trumps ability” (DTA) model is often interpreted as a mechanism supporting epistemic democracy. However, as a variety of empirical and mathematical studies have shown, if we attempt to test the realism of the model, it turns out that it points as much toward epistocracy as democracy. This might appear to leave epistocracy with an advantage, since its rationale is not usually thought to rely on the DTA but on the obvious relevance of expertise to making complex decisions. Yet if we apply the same test to epistocracy that we should apply to epistemic democracy—the test of realism—we find that it, too, is unsustainable. This suggests that epistemic democracy and epistocracy alike are indefensible on the basis of the abstract assumptions about diversity and expertise on which the DTA is predicated.sr
dc.language.isoensr
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis Onlinesr
dc.rightsclosedAccesssr
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.sourceA Journal of Politics and Societysr
dc.subjectdivesitysr
dc.subjectabilitysr
dc.subjectexpertisesr
dc.subjectdemocracysr
dc.subjectepistemic democracysr
dc.subjectepistocracysr
dc.subjectrealismsr
dc.subjectHong-Page theoremsr
dc.subjectJason Brennansr
dc.titleHow Realistic Is the Modeling of Epistemic Democracy?sr
dc.typearticlesr
dc.rights.licenseBY-NC-NDsr
dc.rights.holderTaylor & Francissr
dc.citation.epage298
dc.citation.issue2
dc.citation.spage279
dc.citation.volume34
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/08913811.2022.2055899
dc.type.versionacceptedVersionsr


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Приказ основних података о документу